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Abstract Many children with Autism Spectrum Disor-
ders (ASD) participate in social skills or Theory of Mind
(ToM) treatments. However, few studies have shown evi-
dence for their effectiveness. The current study used a
randomized controlled design to test the effectiveness of a
16-week ToM treatment in 8–13 year old children with
ASD and normal IQs (n = 40). The results showed that,
compared to controls, the treated children with ASD
improved in their conceptual ToM skills, but their ele-
mentary understanding, self reported empathic skills or
parent reported social behaviour did not improve. Despite
the effects on conceptual understanding, the current study
does not indicate strong evidence for the effectiveness of a
ToM treatment on the daily life mindreading skills.
Keywords Autism  Treatment  Theory of Mind  Social
cognition  Randomized controlled trial
Introduction
Theory of Mind is the ability to attribute subjective mental
states to oneself and to others (Baron-Cohen et al. 2000).
This ability is crucial to the understanding of one’s own
and other people’s behaviour. Autism Spectrum Disorders
(ASD) are strongly associated with impairments of Theory
of Mind skills. Following the great number of studies that
have established this impairment (Yirmiya et al. 1998),
interventions have been developed worldwide to improve
the Theory of Mind skills of individuals with autism (Hess
et al. 2008). Despite these efforts, little is known about
whether, when, where and for whom these treatment pro-
grams work in autism (Koenig et al. 2009). Research to
date is hampered by small samples, the absence of ran-
domized controlled trials, and poorly designed outcome
measures (Smith et al. 2007; Lord et al. 2005). The current
study describes a randomized controlled trial on the
effectiveness of a Theory of Mind training in 40 school
aged children with ASD and normal intelligence (High
Functioning Autism Spectrum Disorders, HFASD).
Large scale, randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are
rare in autism, even when considering the wider domain of
social skills training. Several recent reviews of studies on
social skills treatment indicate that programs are often not
even based on manual curricula, and fail to identify pri-
mary outcome measures (Seida et al. 2009; White et al.
2007; Matson et al. 2007). Given the variation in the nature
of both treatment and outcome variables, it is unsurprising
that the empirical support for the effectiveness of social
skills training in autism is regarded incomplete. However,
currently available evidence is generally regarded positive,
and these programs continue to be used widely (Reichow
and Volkmar 2010; Rao et al. 2008).
Considering the more narrowly deﬁned Theory of Mind
training programs, one might expect clearer treatment
programs and outcome measures. Indeed, despite the
variety in terminology—including trials that target ‘Theory
of Mind’ (Ozonoff and Miller 1995), ‘social cognition’
(Turner-Brown et al. 2008), ‘mental state- or mind reading’
(Golan and Baron-Cohen 2006), ‘picture-in-the-head
teaching’ (Swettenham 1996), or ‘thought-bubble training’
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DOI 10.1007/s10803-010-1121-9(Wellman et al. 2002)—there is a clear overlap. All pro-
grams focus children on the internal, subjective mental
representations of themselves and those around them.
When considering this overlapping construct, a next
question is what outcome measures are sensitive to change
and clinically relevant to the construct of Theory of Mind
(Smith et al. 2007; Scahill et al. 2009).
While Theory of Mind research initially relied on
behavioural tasks in primates (Premack and Woodruff
1978), most studies with children are characterized by a
strong focus on conceptual measures. Starting in the early
1980 s, ‘false belief’ type tasks were developed, where a
child was asked to explain the behaviour of an ignorant
story character in a hypothetical scenario (Wellman et al.
2001). These were later adapted to advanced levels, suit-
able for adolescents and adults, which included more
complex scenarios, requiring participants to reason about
embedded mental states, such as what one person thinks
about another person’s thoughts (second order belief rea-
soning) (White et al. 2009). Theory of Mind is usually also
linked, and sometimes even identiﬁed with tasks that focus
on emotion recognition (Baron-Cohen et al. 2001). How-
ever, when considering the function of Theory of Mind,
which involves the mastering of social situations, it is
surprising to ﬁnd so little research on how individuals
actually use their Theory of Mind skills in social interac-
tions (Begeer et al. 2010). Direct measures of these types of
behaviour may be difﬁcult to use in RCTs, which is why
most studies have used informants (parents, teachers), who
report on children’s real life application of Theory of Mind
skills through questionnaires. Applied or naturalistic mea-
sures of advanced Theory of Mind have also used video-
taped social interactions or emotional expressions, which
may be suitable as outcome measures (Golan and Baron-
Cohen 2006).
To date, two RCTs speciﬁcally focused on the effec-
tiveness of training Theory of Mind skills. Fisher and
Happe (2005) selected 6–15 year olds with ASD and
varying cognitive abilities, based on their poor Theory of
Mind skills. The training, based on Swettenham et al.’s
(1996) picture in the head procedure, included up to 10
individual 20–25 min sessions, lasting 5–8 days. Com-
pared to a control group, the trained children, ranging from
mentally retarded to normal intelligent, showed marked
improvements in their performance on Theory of Mind
tasks, which remained stable at follow up, between 6 and
12 weeks later. However, the training did not affect chil-
dren’s emotion recognition skills, nor their daily life The-
ory of Mind use, as reported by their teachers (Fisher and
Happe 2005). The second RCT showed the effect of a
computer program for training emotion recognition. Six to
18 year olds with ASD and varying cognitive abilities
improved compared to a control group on emotion
recognition in cartoons and second order Theory of Mind
reasoning, but not on their recognition of facial emotional
expressions (Silver and Oakes 2001).
Furthermore, two controlled (but not randomized) trails
with HFASD adults indicated that training the recognition
of emotions and mental states with a computer program
improved performance on those measures that were also
used in the training sessions. No improvements were found
on tasks targeting emotion and mental state recognition
skills that were not used in the training (Golan and Baron-
Cohen 2006). The effectiveness of the ‘Social Cognition
and Interaction Training’ was shown in adults with HFASD
who improved on Theory of Mind skills but less on social
communication, relative to a non-treated control groups
(Turner-Brown et al. 2008). In short, the examination of
various programs for training Theory of Mind skills in
ASD and HFASD show that generalization of Theory of
Mind skills to daily life behaviour is often poor.
Besides the elementary question of effectivity it is piv-
otal to predict which children beneﬁt most from treatments
(Koenig et al. 2009). When considering the larger number
of studies that have addressed social skills training, age is
regarded an important factor, and it is generally recom-
mended to treat children as young as possible (Dawson
et al. 2010; Lord et al. 2005; Granpeesheh et al. 2009).
However, on average ASD diagnoses are identiﬁed at age
5.7, which highlights the need for effective treatments at
later ages (Shattuck et al. 2009). Furthermore, individuals
with less severe subtypes of autism, such as PDDNOS, and
higher intellectual functioning generally respond better to
interventions (Lord et al. 2005), thought the effect of IQ
has been prone to mixed ﬁndings (Beglinger and Smith
2005).
To date no RCTs have speciﬁcally focused on children
with high functioning ASD, despite the wide use of these
types of training in high functioning samples. The current
study described a randomized controlled trial on the
treatment effect of a Theory of Mind training. This pro-
gram has been shown to increase the Theory of Mind skills
of children with social handicaps (Steerneman et al. 1996),
and its efﬁcacy in children with autism has been suggested
in an open trial (Gevers et al. 2006). To our knowledge,
this is the ﬁrst RCT for this training program, and one of
the few for Theory of Mind treatments worldwide.
The study included 40 children with HFASD aged
8–13 years old. During 16 one-hour weekly group meet-
ings children were trained on precursors of Theory of Mind
(perception, imitation, emotion recognition, pretence),
elementary Theory of Mind understanding (belief and false
belief understanding) and advanced Theory of Mind
understanding (second order reasoning and the use of irony
and humour). Parents were provided with ﬁve psycho
educative sessions, and they were actively involved in the
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current training using outcome measures with different
levels of complexity. This enabled us to more closely
delineate at what speciﬁc levels the training was effective.
Both mental state and emotion understanding were there-
fore measured at elementary and advanced levels. Fur-
thermore, we assessed self-reported empathy, and we asked
parents to judge the social skills of their children before
and after the treatment.
It was hypothesised that the treatment group would
increase their Theory of Mind skills in comparison to the
waitlist control group on all domains. Furthermore, it was
expected that the conceptual skills, as measured with the
mental state and emotion understanding tasks, would
improveatahigherratethanthepracticalskills,asmeasured
by the parent reports. Finally, it was expected that children
with PDDNOS would beneﬁt more from the treatment than
children with Autism or Asperger’s syndrome.
Method
Participants
Participants were 40 children with HFASD, aged
8–13 years old. Inclusion criteria were a clinical diagnosis
within the Autism Spectrum (Autism, Asperger Syndrome
or PDD-NOS), and IQ scores within the normal range (70
or above), as measured by the short version of the Dutch
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC-III; De
Kort et al. 2002). The ASD participants were recruited
from an academic centre for child and adolescent psychi-
atry in Amsterdam, the Netherlands (de Bascule). Their
diagnostic classiﬁcation was based on assessments on
multiple occasions by a child psychiatrist and multiple
informants (psychologists and educationalists). All partic-
ipants fulﬁlled established diagnostic criteria according to
the DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000). For all children, additional
diagnostic information was obtained with the Social
Responsiveness Scale (SRS; Constantino et al. 2003), the
parental-reported Autism Spectrum Quotient (Baron-
Cohen et al. 2001, 2006), or both. These measures con-
ﬁrmed the ASS diagnoses of all participants (Table 1). The
VU University of Amsterdam Human Ethics Committee
approved the project. Informed consent was obtained from
parents and assent from children.
Intervention
The Theory of Mind training (Gevers et al. 2006; Steern-
eman et al. 1996) is a manualized treatment program, that
includes 16 weekly sessions of approximately 1,5 h each,
provided to 5 or 6 children simultaneously, with a mutual
age difference that does not exceed 3 years. All sessions
were supervised by certiﬁed therapists, and every last
15 min, children are joined by their parents, who are
informed about the meeting and briefed about the assign-
ments for the next meeting. In addition, parents attend
monthly trainings, where they are informed about the
content of the training and about the progress of their
children, and given suggestions on how to promote social
cognition through playing games and story telling.
The training includes 53 structured sessions, which
increasingly focus on the use of Theory of Mind skills.
After initially highlighting precursors of Theory of Mind,
such as listening to others, making acquaintance, percep-
tion and imitation, children are focused on the difference
between fantasy and reality, learning to assess a social
situation and the recognition of other’s intentions and
emotions—happiness, anger, fear and sadness. Following
this, attention is given to elementary Theory of Mind skills,
such as placing oneself in the thoughts and feelings of
another (ﬁrst order mental state reasoning). Deceipt and
deception are central elements of this type of mental state
reasoning, and children are focused on deceived others who
Table 1 Baseline Demographics and Clinical Features of Treatment
and Waitlist Groups (n = 36)
Treatment
(n = 19)
No treatment
(n = 17)
p
Age, years 10;3 (1;3) 10;3 (1;1) .91
8;5–13;7 8;3–12;7
Gender (female/male) 1/18 2/15 .52
Diagnosis .09
Autism 2 0
Asperger 3 7
PDDNOS 14 10
Full scale IQ 100.1 (15.3) 103.3 (12.9) .49
79–133 82–126
Verbal IQ 101.3 (16.2) 109.1(11.1) .12
68–123 89–130
Nonverbal IQ 98.4 (16.8) 96.6 (17.9) .77
73–132 67–125
Autism quotient score 125.7 (19.4) 138.9 (19.8) .14
99–153 114–175
(n = 10) (n = 11)
Social responsiveness scale 74.9 (21.6) 80.2 (22.54) .61
51–110 39–124
(n = 9) (n = 10)
Co-morbidity
No co-morbidity 14 14 .60
ADHD 4 3
Learning disorder 1 0
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123have a different perspective on reality than they do. Fur-
thermore, the use of imagination is stimulated, and children
practise the understanding of humour. A ﬁnal stage of the
training involves practicing with second order mental state
reasoning, where embedded mental states are attributed to
others (e.g., ‘where does Mary think that John thinks he
will ﬁnd the toy?’). Each activity is dealt with in a speciﬁc
session, which become increasingly more difﬁcult as the
training proceeds, see Steerneman (1994) for detailed
descriptions of all sessions, and Steerneman et al. (1996)
for various speciﬁc examples of the training approach.
To sustain treatment integrity therapists received train-
ing in the procedure and were required to follow a manual
that delineates each treatment on a session-by-session basis
(Steerneman et al. 1996). Furthermore, a random 10%
sample of therapy sessions was videotaped for content
review and intervention adherence. Therapists received
ongoing clinical supervision and training throughout the
study.
Randomization
Randomization took place at an individual level after the
baseline measurement and 1 week before the start of the
interventions. Subjects were randomized into and inter-
vention group (n = 20) and a waiting list control group
(n = 20). An independent researcher made the allocation
schedule. The waitlist control group started with the
intervention after their waitlist period. Unfortunately, we
were unable to obtain data from three children (one from
the treatment group, two from the waitlist group) at Time 2
(see Fig. 1).
Assessed for eligibility (n= 40) 
Excluded  (n= 0) 
Allocation 
Analysis 
Follow-Up 
Enrollment 
Randomized (n=40) 
Completed Time 2 assessment (n=19) 
Lost to follow up (n=1) 
    Give reasons: Family refused to  
     return for testing 
Completed Time 2 assessment (n=17) 
Lost to follow up (n=3) 
    Give reasons: Family refused to  
     return for testing 
Allocated to ToM intervention 
(n=   20) 
Received allocated intervention 
(n=  20) 
Analyzed (n= 17) 
Excluded from analysis (n= 0) 
Analyzed (n= 19) 
Excluded from analysis (n= 0) 
Allocated to Waitlist control group 
(n= 20) 
Fig. 1 CONSORT diagram
showing disposition of the
entire sample
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123Outcome Measures
The ToM Test
The Theory of Mind test (Muris et al. 1999; Gevers et al.
2006) is a 72-item standardized interview targeting the
Theory of Mind understanding of 5–13 year old children.
The interview includes stories and drawings, and focuses
on precursors of ToM (22 items, including perception and
imitation, emotion recognition, pretence and physical-
reality distinction), elementary Theory of Mind (38 items,
including ﬁrst order belief reasoning, false belief under-
standing) and advanced Theory of Mind (12 items,
including second order belief understanding, understanding
and complex humour). The internal consistency of the task
ranges from .80 to .92. Concurrent validity of the ToM test
with traditional ToM tasks is high (r between .37 and .77)
and the test–retest reliability was satisfactory (ICC between
.80 and .99). Discriminant validity of the ToM task was
supported by worse performances of children with ASD
compared to typically developing children, but also com-
pared to children with other psychiatric disorders (i.e.,
ADHD an anxiety disorders). Furthermore, these differ-
ences remained when controlling for intelligence (Muris
et al. 1999).
The Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale for Children
(LEAS-C)
The LEAS-C is a performance based assessment of the
structure and complexity of emotional awareness, includ-
ing 12 scenarios where the subject has to imagine him or
herself in a hypothetical interaction with another person.
Subjects are asked to describe the feelings of themselves
and the other person following scenarios that are designed
to elicit the emotions happiness, anger, sadness or fear. The
scoring of the LEAS-C determines the degree of com-
plexity in children’s responses with regard to their own and
the other person’s emotions. Four levels of awareness are
differentiated with increasing complexity: 1. Somatic (e.g.,
‘I would feel sick’), 2. Action (e.g., ‘I would feel like
smashing the wall’), 3. One-dimensional emotions (e.g., ‘I
would feel happy’), or 4. Multiple emotions (e.g., ‘I would
be angry but also a bit sad’). Besides the awareness of these
emotions in oneself and others, speciﬁc scores were
awarded for responses that acknowledged own and others
mixed emotions (e.g., ‘I would feel happy because I won,
but sad for my friend’), or complex emotions (e.g., ‘She
would be jealous’). Mixed and complex emotions could be
attributed to the self (one point), the other (two points) of
both self and others (three points). Internal consistency
ranges from .64 to .71, and convergent validity was
acceptable, based on signiﬁcant correlations with emotion
expression (.30) and emotion comprehension (.28) (Bajgar
et al. 2005; Gooren et al. 2008).
Self Reported Empathy
The Index of Empathy for Children and Adolescents
(Bryant 1982) measures empathy in children of 6 years and
older, targeting various emotional reactions. It includes 10
dichotomous items such as ‘‘It makes me sad to see a boy
who can’t ﬁnd anyone he can play with’’. The scale shows
adequate internal consistency (ranging from .68 to .79),
good test–retest reliability, ranging from .81 to .83, strong
convergent validity with affect based empathy scales
(r = .76), and was not related to reading achievement
(Bryant 1982).
The Children’s Social Behaviour Questionnaire (CSBQ)
is a 49 item parent questionnaire, relating to six scales:
behaviour and emotions not optimally tuned to the social
situation, reduced social contacts and social interests, ori-
entation problems in time, place, or activity, difﬁculties in
understanding social information, stereotypical behaviour,
and fear of and resistance to changes (higher scores indi-
cate more problem behaviour). This questionnaire has been
shown to discriminate between TD and children with ASD.
The internal consistency is .90, and interrater reliability is
.80 (de Bildt et al., 2009; Hartman et al., 2006). In the
current sample, the reliability of the CSBQ was .92.
Data analysis and Presentation
Data analysis focuses on estimating the size and clinical
importance of the effects in the population based on the
sample data, using Time 1 and Time 2 difference score
means, 95% conﬁdence intervals (CIs), effect sizes, and
clinical importance, as recommended by CONSORT
(Moher et al. 2001) and the American Psychological
Association (2001). One-way between groups analyses of
variance are reported to compare how groups, on average,
differ in gains. Between-group effect sizes were calculated
according to Cohen’s d. Effect sizes of 0.8 can be assumed
to be large, while effect sizes of 0.5 are moderate, and
effect sizes of 0.2 are small (Cohen 1988).
Results
Preliminary Analyses
Baseline differences in demographic and clinical charac-
teristics were investigated using Chi-square tests and
analyses of variance (ANOVA). No signiﬁcant group dif-
ferences were found in terms of chronological age, gender,
diagnoses, verbal, non-verbal and full scale IQ, SRS and
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123AQ score. In Table 1, the descriptive information is shown
for all demographic data.
Improvement in Theory of Mind as a Function
of Training
The effect of the Theory of Mind training was ﬁrst
examined on the total score of the Theory of Mind test. The
treatment group showed signiﬁcantly more improvement in
their Theory of Mind understanding than the control group,
F(1, 34) = 5.01, p\.03, d = .75. When analysing the
improvement on the three subscales of the Theory of Mind
task, in particular the elementary Theory of Mind tasks,
including ﬁrst order and false belief reasoning, showed a
strong improvement compared to the control group, F(1,
34) = 9.00, p\.01, d = 1.00. No treatment effect was
found on the more basic precursors of Theory of Mind,
including perception, imitation and emotion recognition,
and more advanced ToM, including questions regarding
second order beliefs and humour (Table 2).
Improvement in Emotion Understanding as a Function
of Training
Training effects on the level of emotional awareness were
analysed separately for own, others, and total emotional
awareness. No difference was found between the increase
on these measures for the treatment and the control groups.
However, the treatment group improved signiﬁcantly
compared to controls on their report of mixed emotions,
F(1, 31) = 6.39, p\.05, d = .84, and complex emotions,
F(1, 31) = 13.26, p\.01, d = 1.19 (Table 2).
Improvement in Self Reported Empathy and Parent
Reported Social Skills as a Function of Training
No effects of the training were found on self reported
empathy, F\1, or on parent reported social skills, F\1
(Table 2).
Diagnosis and Co-Morbidity
When treatment effects were analysed separately in chil-
dren with PDDNOS or high functioning autism (HFA)/
Aspergers syndrome, the PDDNOS group performed in
keeping with the overall analysis. Treatment effects were
found on the total Theory of Mind scores, F(1, 18) = 3.29,
p\.05 (one-sided), d = .79, and in particular on the ele-
mentary Theory of Mind tasks, F(1, 18) = 6.23, p\.05,
d = 1.08, and the understanding of mixed emotions, F(1,
18) = 5.06, p\.05, d = .97, and complex emotions, F(1,
18) = 6.37, p\.05, d = 1.09. Interestingly, the HFA/
Asperger syndrome group only showed improvement on
their understanding of complex emotions, F(1, 9) = 6.18,
p\.01, d = .1.41, but not on any of the other measures.
Theselfreportedempathyorparentreportedsocialskillsdid
not show treatment effects in the separate diagnosticgroups.
In addition, running the main analyses without the
children with co/morbid ADHD or learning disorder
showed the same results as the overall analysis including
all children: the treatment was effective on conceptual
Theory of Mind skills and complex emotion understanding,
but failed to show an effect on self reported empathy or
parent reported social behaviour.
Discussion
While Theory of Mind training programs are no novelty for
individuals with autism, the evidence for their effectiveness
has not been well researched, with only two RCTs to date.
It is particularly acute to establish evidence-based treat-
ments for autism because of the variety of novel and
alternative treatments that are offered to this group, some
of which can be dangerous to the child (Wadman 2008d).
The current study was conducted to examine the effect
of training Theory of Mind skills on conceptual under-
standing of Theory of Mind and emotion, self reported
empathy and parent reported social skills in children with
HFASD. Effects of the treatment were found on the con-
ceptual understanding of Theory of Mind, in particular on
the ability to reason about beliefs and false beliefs, and on
the understanding of mixed and complex emotions. Other
conceptual measures such as precursors of Theory of Mind
(perception and imitation, emotion recognition, pretence
and physical-reality distinction), advanced Theory of Mind
(second order reasoning and understanding humour), and
the awareness of emotions were not affected by the treat-
ment. Furthermore, the Theory of Mind training did not
improve children’s social skills according to their parents,
nor their self reported empathy.
As expected, the treatment had a higher impact on
conceptual abilities than on daily life skills, as reported by
children’s parents. Within the conceptual domain, it should
be noted that no effects were found on the precursors of
Theory of Mind and basic emotion understanding. This
ﬁnding may be unsurprising given the children’s cognitive
abilities and their average age of 10 years at treatment
onset. However, it should be noted that the children did not
perform on ceiling level on any of the precursor tasks
(Table 2). These ﬁndings may be used to focus the treat-
ment on more advanced levels of Theory of Mind and
emotion understanding, though the absence of conceptual
improvement on advanced Theory of Mind understanding
may also indicate the limitations of their conceptual growth
abilities.
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123Table 2 Means (SD),
difference score, effect sizes
and 95% conﬁdence intervals
(CI), and summary statistics for
one-way between groups Anova
for treatment and Waitlist
control groups
Means (SD) [95% CI] Group difference
Treatment
(n = 19)
Waitlist control
(n = 17)
Fp
Theory of Mind total score (max score = 72)
Time 1 50.89 (5.31) 54.00 (5.93)
Time 2 58.21 (4.00) 58.00 (5.78)
Difference score 7.31 [5.20, 9.42] 4.00 [1.69, 6.31] 5.01 .03
Effect size 1.49 .79
Theory of Mind precursors (max score = 22)
Time 1 18.05 (1.51) 17.94 (1.89)
Time 2 19.37 (1.38) 19.05 (1.71) .11 .75
Difference score 1.32 [.34, 2.29] 1.11 [.31, 1.93]
Effect size .58 .63
Elementary Theory of Mind (max score = 38)
Time 1 25.10 (3.30) 27.59 (3.12)
Time 2 29.84 (2.36) 29.24 (3.70)
Difference score 4.74 [3.44, 6.03] 1.64 [-.14, 3.44] 9.00 .005
Effect size 1.58 .42
Advanced Theory of Mind scale (max score = 12)
Time 1 7.44 (1.00) 8.47 (1.91)
Time 2 9.00 (2.11) 9.71 (1.45) .00 .95
Difference score 1.26 [.69, 1.83] 1.23 [.52, 1.95]
Effect size .95 .79
LEAS-C total (max score = 48)
Time 1 32.89 (8.64) 31.53 (5.95)
Time 2 37.72 (10.73) 33.47 (6.40)
Difference score 4.83 [-1.04,10.71] 1.94 [-.89,4.78] .84 .37
Effect size .36 .31
LEAS-C mixed emotions (max score = 36)
Time 1 1.83 (1.72) 2.94 (3.11)
Time 2 4.72 (5.40) 2.24 (3.19)
Difference score 2.89 [.22,5.56] -.71 [-1.95,.53] 6.39 .02
Effect size .48 .26
LEAS-C complex emotions (max score = 36)
Time 1 1.89 (2.87) 4.52 (4.45)
Time 2 4.16 (4.40) 1.71 (3.06) 13.26 .001
Difference score 2.28 [.42,4.13] -2.82 [-5.16,-.49]
Effect size .54 .26
Self reported empathy (max score = 10)
Time 1 3.95 (2.07) 4.65 (2.18)
Time 2 4.00 (2.62) 4.41 (2.11)
Difference score .05 [-1.25,1.35] -.24 [-1.79,1.32] .09 .77
Effect size .02 .07
CSBQ (max score = 98)
Time 1 36.67 (14.76) 42.94 (13.77)
Time 2 34.80 (17.60) 40.00 (14.54)
Difference score -1.87 [-8.48, 4.74] -2.94 [-12.41, 6.51] .04 .84
Effect size .14 .16
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123The understanding of beliefs and false beliefs, which are
a main focus of the treatment, were shown to improve
relative to the waitlist control group. This replicates, for the
ﬁrst time with a RCT, that children with HFASD can be
taught to understand beliefs, desires and emotions (Hadwin
et al. 1996; Swettenham 1996). Still, the current ﬁnding
may be unsurprising, given that the treatment program
includes a strong focus on belief and false belief reasoning,
and, more importantly, because the extensive belief and
false belief material from the Theory of Mind under-
standing scale was also used during the training. Effects on
treatment incorporated outcome measures, which are
absent on measures outside the program have been found
repeatedly in children with ASD (Golan and Baron-Cohen
2006; Fisher and Happe 2005; Turner-Brown et al. 2008),
suggesting ‘‘teaching to the test’’ effects. Still, previously
found suggestions of a link between Theory of Mind
understanding and everyday social and behaviour in ASD
give some merit to training these conceptual skills: they
may have some bearing on children’s actual behaviour
(Peterson et al. 2009).
Generalization difﬁculties of individuals with ASD have
been reported for decades (Klin et al. 2003). These difﬁ-
culties may represent a strong tendency to conceive the
world systematically, without making the uncertain
assumptions that are needed to generalize skills to new
situations (Golan and Baron-Cohen 2006). This tendency
may be intrinsic to the autistic disorder, and one way for-
ward may be to look for speciﬁc types of children with
ASD that show better generalization skills. Alternatively,
treatment programs may be speciﬁcally designed to train
the generalization of behavioural skills rather than con-
ceptual understanding. On a more fundamental level, it
may even be the question whether social behaviour should
be conceived of as the generalization of social under-
standing. Young typically developing children often show
adequate empathic behaviour, while unable to pass the
most elementary Theory of Mind tasks, and adults who
pass the most advanced conceptual Theory of Mind tasks
have been shown to fail in direct measures of their per-
spective taking abilities in natural situations (Begeer et al.
2010). In addition, the ToM training may be too broad in its
current form, and could be revised to focus on more spe-
ciﬁc areas, which may then be measured with speciﬁc
outcome measures.
Children with PDDNOS may beneﬁt more from the
treatment than children with HFA/Asperger. While this
ﬁnding is in need for replication, and more measures are
needed to differentiate between PDDNOS and HFA/As-
perger, it highlights an important issue with regard to
treatment in autism. Children with ASD show large indi-
vidual differences. While it is often difﬁcult and time
consuming to ﬁnd appropriate treatments for each
individual child, it would be extremely useful to delineate
whether children with PDDNOS beneﬁt more from this
type of treatment than children with HFA/Asperger, who
may be questioned to beneﬁt from the treatment at all.
Besides the DSM categories of the autistic disorder, in
may also be useful to highlight other possible categories,
based on age, IQ, or severity of the disorder. Unfortu-
nately, due to the size of the current sample, we were
unable to identify predictors or moderators of treatment
effects in a meaningful way. Further limitations of the
current study include the absence of diagnostic instru-
ments such as the ADOS and the ADI-R, and the absence
of follow up data. Furthermore, the ﬁdelity checks on the
treatment were currently based on 10% of the treatments,
leaving the possibility that the other sessions had lower
ﬁdelity.
In short, the current study suggests that the Theory of
Mind treatment could be a promising intervention for
children with HFASD, but further study is indicated. The
conceptual Theory of Mind understanding increased rela-
tive to a control group, while self reported empathy and
parent reported social skills remained stable. Important
issues for future studies are the use of more sensitive
measures of daily life Theory of Mind skills. The current
CSBQ questionnaire, like many parent questionnaires of
social skills, focus on broad domains of behaviour, which
may have minimal sensitivity to change (e.g., ‘he or she
lives in her own world’). Using ratings of speciﬁed Theory
of Mind related behaviour over a ﬁxed period of time may
provide more sensitive outcomes. Furthermore, it should
also be considered to refrain from focusing on social skills,
and highlight how children experience their functioning
before and after the treatment period, to test the possibility
that treatment may not increase children’s objectively
measured social skills, but could enhance their quality of
life nonetheless, by increasing their self-esteem.
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